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Emergency 
Feed Grain storage 
for New England 
By William J. Hanekamp and Stanley K. Seaver 
Depa rtment of Ag ricultural Economics and Aural Sociology 
Introduction 
Over the last 20 years the formula feed manufacturing industry of New 
England has been plagued by a series of rail shut downs. In the middle 1950's, 
severe winter storms crippled rail service for weeks; in 1969 harsh winter con-
ditions in combination with rail union disputes stalled rail service for months; 
and in 1977, 1978. and 1979, long-haul rail service was paralyzed. Each of 
these crisis periods caused significant disruptions in the production schedules 
of the region's formula feed industry. Inventories of many feed ingredients 
were drained, feed production schedules were altered, and deliveries of mixed 
feed to poultry and dairy farmers were delayed for extended periods. 
The disruptions which characterized the feed production process during 
these acute winter seasons underline a major concern among public and 
private members of New England's agricultural communit y. There is a grow-
ing belief that agriculture can no longer depend on the regional feed manufac-
turing industry to unilaterally execute emergency feed processing plans. The 
costs of guaranteeing an emergency flow of feed ingredients and mixed feed to 
livestock producers are rising, which places a greater financial burden on in-
dividual firms. As a result , attention is now focu sing on alternative systems to 
insulate the grain trade from further breakdowns of transportation services. 
The objectives of this study focus on three critical areas of the reserve 
storage issue. They include: (1) determinat ion of the existing grain storage 
capacity of the mixed feed manufacturing industry of New England, (2) deter-
mination of the ability of the industry to insure itself a steady supply of grains 
and feedstuffs to continue feed manufacturing operations , and (3) identifica-
tion of the alternatives available to the industry to achieve a satisfactory 
reserve storage capability. 
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FEED INGREDIENT STORAGE IN 
NEW ENGLAND, JANUARY 1, 1977 
The commercial feed mixing industry of New England maintains an in-
gredient storage capacity of approximately 107,000 tons. This capacity 
represents silos and other enclosed facilities used to stock livestock feed inputs. 
Among the ingredients stored are whole corn, hominy, soybean meal, mid-
dlings, brewers grain, millers grain, and gluten feed. 
Storage capacities for the region show significant variations by state. 
Maine and Connecticut, for example, account for 70 percent of the regions 
total capacity. With a significant poultry industry operating in the two states, 
they represent the principle storage areas for whole corn. In contrast the state 
of Rhode Island maintains limited storage capacity. With no major commer-
cial feed mixing plant operating in the state, storage in Rhode Island is con-
fined to those agribusiness firms serving as wholesale or retail finished feed 
outlets (Table I). 
TABLE 1. Feed Storage Capacity in New England, By States, January 1, 1977. 
Commercial Feed Mixing Plants' Storage Capacity 
Siale Corn Other Grains Total 
........................ to n s ........................ 
·tons· 
Maine 41,841 7,146 48,987 
Vermont 3,100 14,348 17,448 
Massachusettsl 
New Hampshire 10,328 6,195 16,523 
Rhode Island 
Connecticut 20,936 3,164 24,100 
NEW ENGLAND 76,205 30,853 107,058 
Source: Survey of New England Feed Manufacturing Plants - April 1977. 
Seasonal Storage 
During the calendar year the levels of feed ingredients held in storage 
fluctuate. The seasonal shift in storage is, in part, a product of the size of the 
individual firm. Feed mixing plants with limited storage capacities generally 
maintain supplies near capacity throughout the year. More variable storage 
utilization is practiced by plants with large storage capacities. Typically these 
larger enterprises show acute cyclical shifts in the use of storage capacities dur-
ing the year. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the standard storage utilization patterns of New 
England feed mixing plants. For the majority of the firms with capacities 
Figure 1. Seasonal Uti 1 izati on of Storage Ca pac i ties 
by New Eng l and Feed Mi x i ng Plant s , 1976_ 
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under 4,000 tons, inventories average 85 percent of capacity and seldom were 
allowed to fall below 70 percent. Stocks below the 70 percent level generally 
were a product of disruptions in normal operating procedures. For firms with 
storage capacities in excess of 5,000 tons, the utilizat ion of faciliti es ranged 
from 45 to 90 percent. There were only a few exceptions to this pattern . The 
exceptions were generally recorded by those firms with storage capacities of 
5,000 to 7,000 tons with milling capacities of 400 tons per day. Their cyclical 
shifts in storage occasionally dipped to 60 percent of capacity. 
Although storage patterns fluctuate by size of operations, the majority 
of feed mixing plants fu lly utilized their storage facilities during late November 
through the end of February. In terms of total volume. it represented an inven-
tory on hand of 91,000 tons for the region (Table 2). The accumulation of this 
TABLE 2. New England Feed Production And Ingredient Storage Position 1977. 
Estimated Average Supplies Avall-
Total Supplies Weekly able to Support 
Storage in Storage Demand for Production 
State Capacity Finished Feed Schedules 
Winter Winter 
·································tons················· ................ ·days· 
Maine 48,987 41 ,639 15,952 18.3 
Vermont 17,448 14,831 10,060 10.3 
Massachusett sl 
New Hampshire 16,523 14,045 8,761 11.2 
Connecticut! Rhode Island 24,100 20,485 10,182 14.1 
NEW ENGLAND 107,058 91 ,000 44,955 14.1 
Source: Survey of New England Feed Manufacturing Plans - April 1977. 
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vo lume was a response in part to (I) the availabi lity of fa ll harvest supplies in 
the midwest, and (2) the difficulties of keeping feed procuremen t channels 
open during the emire winter season. 
Even with feedstuff reserves at optimum storage levels , it st ill represents 
a limited supply of feed ingredients. Weekly production schedules for example 
require 45,000 tons of ingredients to be all ha nd. At this level sup plies in 
storage can guarantee ingredient demand for no more than 14.1 days. 
The inventory reserve position , however, varies significant ly among the 
indiv idual states of New England. fn the win te r season , feed mixers in Ver· 
mont , for example, can maintain produc tion schedules for ten days, the lowest 
in New England. In contrast the largesl feedst uff reserves are held in Ma ine 
with 18.0 days supply . For Connecticut, inventories held in the winter are suf· 
ficiem to support feed mixing schedules for 14. 1 days. 
Rail Service to New England 
The shipment as we ll as the storage of feed ingredients represents a 
critical component in the manufacture of li vestock feed in New England . For 
over fou r decades the dominant mode of t ransporting feed ingredients into the 
region has been rail. It represents the primary link from the grain supply 
cen ters of the Midwest to eastern users. 
Movement of feedstuffs travels over a variety of railroad ro utes. T he 
primary roules eastward include the direct link from Toledo, Ohio, to New 
England, and the northern route connecting Detroit, Michigan, to Mont real, 
Canada. Through the years the service over these northeastern routes has been 
subject to breakdowns and transit delays. Under normal service conditions, 
grai n shipments eastward require 7 to 14 days to reach their destination points. 
However. there have been numerous occasio ns when feed mixing firm s have 
experienced t ransit delays of 25 to 32 days (Table 3). 















De lays in 
Shipments 
..... .. ...................................... days ·········· .................................. . 
7·10 32 22·25 
14 30 16 
10·12 30 18·20 
7·10 30 20·23 
7· 10 25 15·18 
Source: Survey of New England Feed Manu facturing Plan l s - April 1977. 
The cause for such delays is due to a host of rail movement and service 
factors. Among the most common are misclassification of rail cars at switch· 
ing yards, limited availability of hopper cars at supply points, delays in 
transferring cars from terminal yards to receiver spur tracks, and periods of 
unseasonably bad weather which disrupts normal rail operations. The threat 
of these unexpected delays holds importanl implications to the maintenance of 
normal finished feed production schedules. Occasional delays in feedstuff 
shipments will not cripple mixing operations. But if the frequency of delay 
becomes acute, supplies in storage become a critical factor in maintaining con· 
tinuous mixed feed production schedules. 
Extended breakdowns in rail service can create a serious feed shortage in 
New England since each state maintains a limited inventory of feed ingredients 
to service its livestock economy. Extended delays paralleling those shown in 
Table 3 show the potential for feed ingredient shortages in New England . No 
state maintains sufficient feed ingredient reserves to supply its local normal 
mixed reed market (Table 4). 













············································days······ ..................................... . 
Maine 25 18.3 6.7 
Vermont 16 10.3 5.7 
Massachusetts! 
New Hampshire 20 11 .2 8.8 
Connecticutl 
Rhode Island 18 14.1 3.9 
Storage Requirements - A New Perspective 
With the potential of rail service breakdowns extending for periods of 25 
to 32 days, (Table 3), the existing storage capacities of the region's formula 
feed mixing industry are inadequate. A review of the finished feed production 
schedules, based on 1975 demand, shows the need for an additional storage 
capacity of 40,100 tons (Table 5) to guarantee an emergency reserve during 
periods of acute and extended rail service shutdowns. Of the individual states, 
Maine recorded the highest storage needs, 15,200 tons. The state of Vermont 
required 8,200 tons of additional storage capacity, Masachusetts/ New Hamp-
shire 11,000 tons and Connecticut 5,700 tons of reserve storage. 
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1977 - A CASE STUDY 
In the winter of 1977, the Northeast exper ienced an acute breakdown in 
rail service. Heavy snows and ice curtailed operations in key switching yards 
(Cleveland, Ohio; Buffalo. New York; and Montreal, Canada), and stalled the 
movement of traffic along numerous mainline routes. It resulted in extended 
delays in the arrival of goods to numerous industrial and agricultural 
customers. Delays in service paralled those hypothesized in the preceding sec-
tion . 
The breakdown in rail service to New England's feed mixing plants was 
most severe during late January and early February. Thousands of tons of feed 
ingredients were tied up on railroad tracks. With these rail shipments para-
lyzed, local feed mixing mills rapidly exhausted their supplies of feed ingre-
dients. Production schedules were revised and altered to combat the service 
delay, but many feed mixing firm s still experienced critical shortages. 
The extent of the ingredient shortages varied significantly between states 
as shown in Table 6. In Vermont, for example, local mills experienced short-
ages of at least one majo r feed ingredient. These ingredients were either com-
pletely depleted or fell below 10 percent of normal storage levels. The periods 
of shortages ranged from 7 to 30 days. For the states of Maine, Massachusetts, 
and New Hampshire, reports of inventory shortages equal to 10 percent of 
normal stocks ranged from 4 to 14 days. Connecticut feed mixing firm s, 
however, were more fortunate. Inventories of feedstuffs never fell below 30 
percent of normal levels. It must be noted that this inventory in reserve was 
still low. It only represented a six ~day supply of ingredients. 
The shortages in feed ingredients forced many firms to undertake 
emergency actions in the winter of 1977 . Trucking of ingredients from alte r~ 
6 
TABLE 6. Storage Required to Prevent Feedstuff Shortage in the Winter 011977. 
Ingredient Reserve Storage 
Slate Corn Soybean Soft Grains Total 









3,030 270 5,700 9,000 
Connecticut! 
Rh ode Island 
NEW ENGLAND 14,730 1,870 20,500 37, 100 
Source: Survey of New England Feed Manufacturing Plans - June 1977. 
nat ive sources of supply. rerouting of railcars, subst itution for depleted ingre-
dients, limiting customer orders and transferring of ingredient supplies among 
neighboring plants became necessary to continue production schedules. These 
adjustments enabled the feed mixing firm s of Vermont, New Hampshire, Con-
nec ticut, and Massachusetts to mix feed rations th roughout the crisis period. 
For Maine, however, plants were less effective in maintaining production 
schedules. Approximately 50 percent of the commercial feed mixing plants of 
the state were temporarily sh ut down. The periods in which plants ceased feed 
mixing operations varied from one shift to four days. The depletion of sup-
plies of whole corn (yellow No. 2), a major feed ingredient in poultry rations, 
was the primary factor in the decision to shut down. 
The Economic Impact 
The burden of maintaining livestock feed production schedules fell en-
tirely on the formula mixed feed manufacturing industry. Continuation of 
production schedules in the win ter of 1977 resulted in increased costs of opera-
tion for each New England feed mixing plant. 
Among the major costs incurred by local feed mixing firms was the 
underutilization of labor. A survey of the feed mixing industry showed that 
each firm in the region - whether temporarily shut down or under limited 
production schedules - retained all hired personnel on the payroll. The full 
crews were kept on hand in order to respond immediately to the arrival of 
delayed rail shipments. 
A less visible cost to the feed mixing plant s was the inability to maintain 
standard formulas. Often high cost ingredients were substituted for lower cost 
ingredients to maintain proper nutrient and protein standards. This resulted in 
high cost formulations. In general, these added costs were absorbed directly by 
the mixing firm. 
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Another component in the scenario of winter production costs was the 
procurement of emergency supplies of feed ingredients . Many feed mixing 
plants shifted from midwestern sources to suppliers in New York and Penn-
sylvania for immediate delivery. As a result o f the accelera ted purchasing ac-
tivities , prices of ingredien ts in these two markets rose sharp ly forcing New 
England firms to pay premiulll prices . Moreover, New England mixers had to 
bear the cost of trucking emergency supplies to their plants . Common and 
wi ldca t carriers were contracted fo r the long-hau l movements from New York 
and Pennsylvania . 
The act ivities of the firm s in seeking alternative operational st rateg ies 
however did not spare the industry from the cost penalties of a crippled 
rai lroad industry. The fi rms abso rbed the costs of t ransit delays o f cars as we ll 
as the costs associa ted with rero uting rai l cars to avo id tra ffic tie-ups. In addi -
tion approximately 80 percent o f the firm s in the region were assessed addi -
tiona l dem urrage fees . The high demurrage charges were direct ly att ributable 
to the unexpected arrival of la rge numbers of rail ca rs at the feed mill ing sites 
at one time. The feed mi lling facilities typ ica ll y were not equ ipped to un load 
the lots o f arriving cars within the prescr ibed unloading times. 
It is difficult to q uantify the total dollar costs of all the emergency ac-
tions undertaken by [he feed mixing industry. Many of the costs were no t iden-
ti fia ble due to the va riatio n in account ing sys tems used by individual firms. It 
therefore was diffi cult to sepa rate the rea l costs for analysis. One major cost 
component easily defined, however , was the demurrage charged New England 
mills. 
The estimated to tal demurrage charge att ributable 10 the disruptions o f 
normal rai l service was approximately $160,000 (Table 7). For so me firms , 
demurrage was minor while others reported demurrage as high as $50,000_ Th e 
plants o f Vermont and Maine absorbed the larges t share o f this cost. The fees 
represented the charges for the three mo nth period of January-March. For the 
TABLE 7. Demurrage Charged New England and Feed Mixing Firms During January· 
March 1977·. 













• One firm did not respond to th e survey of New Eng land mi lls. 
Source: Survey of New England Feed Manufac turing Plants - June 1977, 
majority of firms March was the high cost period due to the queuing problems 
of delayed car arrivals. With the limited storage and unloading facilities the 
cars could not be efficiently handled. In total, these costs represented a signifi -
cant burden on an industry confronted with an array of financial hardships 
due to the inclement weather. 
Recovery of Losses 
The 1976 tariff regulations did not allow for (he correction of ac-
cumulating demurrage costs in the winter of 1977. Provisions within the tariff 
in fact placed the burden of the cost directly on the railroad customers. Delays 
and tie-ups of rail cars on shipper and receiver tracks were totally the respon-
sibility of the railroad users, not the responsibi li ty of the carriers. 
Action by railroad users was taken to seek relief from the high demur-
rage charges. Presentations were made before the In terstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC) requesting (he demurrage costs be shared by the railroad car-
riers. The ICC responded to the requests of the railroad users in the spring of 
1977. by authorizing an amendment to the existing tariff regulations. This 
amendment provided a 50 percent reduction in the demurrage fees charged 
railroad users. Rate adjustments reduced the $30 and $20 per day demurrage 
levies to $15 and $10 per day respectively. These reductions applied to charges 
incurred between late December to mid-March of 1977. 
Establishment of the amendment toadjust the demurrage costs during the 
winter of 1977 was only a temporary action. It did not establ ish a policy for 
future years. Accordingly, the long-term transportation problems which face 
New England's industrial and agricultural industries still remain. 
Expanding Storage Capacity 
The establishment of reserve storage of feed ingredients represents an 
alternative to combat unreliable rail service. New England, as shown in 
previous data, is in a reserve storage deficit position (Tables 5 and 6). 
Reserve slorage could be expanded under two plans. The first involves 
the utilization of subterminal elevators under a unit-train transportation 
system to move grain to New England locations. The second entai ls the con-
struction of specialized grain storage fac ili ties to function as emergency grain 
supply centers. 
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SUBTERMINAL RESERVE STORAGE 
Examination of the feasibility of developing a subterminal system to ser-
vice New England's feed grain buyers was undertaken in a separate study en-
titled "Unit Train Grain Sub terminals To Service New England's Feed 
Manufacturing Industry - An Economic and Locational Analysis."! This 
work foclised on the economic advantages associated with installing a unit 
train transportation service to move feed grain. A byproduct of the total pro-
gram was the expansion of grain storage throughout New England. 
A subterminal facility is an agri-industriaJ complex composed of grain 
unloading equipment and grain silos. The operational specifications require 
sufficient storage capacity to house grain (corn) in excess of 9,000 tons. It is 
the utilization of this storage capacity which improves the reserve storage posi-
lion of a region. 
The construction of unit train subterminal facilities in New England will 
significantly improve the ability of local feed mixing industry to combat future 
feed grain shortages. For the districts of southern New England, central New 
England, and Maine, it represents sufficient storage to combat the shortages 
recorded in the winter of 1977. A subterminal facility is not economically 
feasible for Vermont but reserve storage of 18,000 tons is still needed to com-
bat all potential local grain shortages. 
Financial Cost 
The capital outlay required to finance the total subterminal project totals 
6.5 million dollars. It represents the total investment cost to construct four 
facilities to service the local feed manufacturing industries of central New 
England, southern New England, Maine and northern Vermont (Appendix 1). 
Annual operating expenditures vary according to the volume of grain 
which is received and distributed by the subterminal facilities. Volumes of 
grain equal to 1975 feed grain import levels place plant costs at 1.55 million 
dollars. The cost to distribute the centrally stored grain to local feed manufac-
turers totals 1.73 million dollars (Appendix 1). 
The overall cost of the grain subterminal project is an investment to 
reduce the costs of transporting feed grain into New England. Preliminary unit 
train tariff rates offered by Conrail and Canadian National rail carriers in 
June of 1977 placed transportation cost savings in the range of the projected 
subterminal development and operational costs (Appendix 2). In total the ex-
pansion of storage capacity under a grain subterminal collection and distribu -
tion plan showed no direct cost to the local feed manufacturing industry except 
in Vermont. 
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lUnpublished manllscript. W.J. Hanekamp, The University of Co nnect icut, Storrs Agricul-
cultural Experimell1 Station, Storrs, Connecticut. 
WINTER RESERVE STORAGE FACILITIES 
Unlike the mUltipurpose uses of a grain subterminal facility, a winter 
storage facility serves but one function. It serves to store feed grains to combat 
potential feed grain shortages. The winter grain storage complex is an in-
surance investment for the feed manufacturers of New England. 
Construction of emergency reserve storage to meet 1977 conditions is re-
quired in three districts to service the region's feed mixers. Facilities need to be 
located in northern Vermont, Maine and southern New England with a total 
storage capacity of 37,000 tons. Reserves of this level would be sufficient to in-
sulate New England against the feed shortages which were experienced in 
1977. ' 
Financial Cost 
Construction of district feed grain facilities for winter storage is a capital 
intensive program. In order to meet the estimated reserve requirements, the 
total silo capacity needed for winter storage is between 34,000 and 37,000 tons. 
The construction cost is estimated to range between 2.8 and 3.5 million dollars 
(Table 8). 
TABLE 8. Estimate Capital Outlay for Winter Silo Storage Facilities, 19771. 
State Estimated Capital Investment - dollars 
·minimum· ·maximum· 
Maine 1,320,000 1,383,000 
Vermont 705,000 1,125,000 
Massachusetts! New Hampshire 303,000 982,000 
Connecticut! Rhode Island 
NEW ENGLAND 2,828,000 3,490,000 
1 These costs are for facilities at new locations and hence include site, railroad siding, 
all new loading and unloading equipment and similar other costs. If storage for 40,000 
tons, which includes Connecticut, were built at existing plants, costs would be reo 
duced approximately one million doffars. The cost, by states, for providing the volume 
of storage indicated in Table 5 is as follows: Maine, $687,750; Vermont, $366,250; 
Massachusetts/New Hampshire, $491,250; and Connecticut, $255,000; or a total of 
$1,791,250. 
The annual costs to operate the facilities include depreciation, taxes, in-
surance, interest on investment capital, and the interest on the value of the 
feedstuffs held in winter storage. Labor costs are minor since skeleton crews 
are sufficient to operate the facilities for no more than three months. 
The expected short term costs result in estimated annual expenditures 
between $533,000 and $686,000 (Table 9). The largest cost component is for 
fixed expenditures. Although the facility is not operational during nine 
months, March to November, the fixed costs of operation still accumulate. 
[Even though Connecticut had no 1977 shortage, additional capacity is required as shown in 
Tables 4 and 5. 
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-" TABLE 9. Estimated Annual Costs of Operation, 1977, Winter Silo Storage. 
Maine Vermont 
Cost Categories Minimum Maximum Min imum Maximum 
Fixed Costs 
Depreciation & Interest 157,320 176,000 77,676 135.506 
(A.E.C.) 
Taxes & Insurance 51,408 57,512 25,383 44.280 
Vari able Costs 
Labor 10,400 10,400 10,400 10.400 
Interest on Inventory1 
8 % per armum 
10 % per annum 37,400 38,750 19,750 31,500 
Total Cost 256,128 282,662 133,209 221 ,686 
NEW ENGLAND (m i n i m urn -max 1m urn . $352 ,740-685 ,749) 2 
Massachu set1sl 
New Hampshire 
Min imum Maximum 
83,287 108,158 
27 ,216 35,343 
10.400 10,400 
22,500 27,500 
143,403 181 ,401 
3.6 percent of Capita/ Investment. Va fuIJ of Feeds tuffs - $l00/ton - F.O.B. New England) 
2 Some additiona l operating costs wo ulo be incurred with buflding emergency storage as indica ted in footnote 
Table 8. These cos ts have not been estimated but would be considerably less than $532.740. 
Comparison of Two Alternatives 
The cons truction of grain subterminal facilities to serve grain traders in 
New England is an economically attracti ve program. It establishes reserve 
storage in the region with a minimum direct capi ta l investment. Ahhough the 
direct cost is minimal due to the potential savings which result from the cost 
econo mies of a unit train delivery system , there arc notable organization prab· 
lerns a ttached to a regional and district subterminal project. 
Under a subterminal program, major changes need to be implemented in 
traditional feed purchasing procedures . Firms served by the subterminal could 
no longer act independently as buyers in the feed grain market. Instead , each 
would need to participate in collecti ve purchasing arrangements with 
neighboring firms to guarantee shipment tonnages sufficient fo r a fu ll unit-
train. Additionally, purchase arrangements would need to be developed under 
long-term contracts . Many local feed manufacturing firms are reluctant to ac-
cept centrali za tio n of purchasing activities. 
New England firms view the individual freedom to speculate on price 
cycles, fluctuations and trends in the market place as an impo rtant factor in 
developing a successful business. Loss o f freedom reduces the managerial 
competition and skill which is an integral part of the feed manufacturing 
business. Few wish to eliminate it as a pro fit -earning instrument. Potential 
profit earnings due to timely grain purchases can easily offset any transporta-
tion cost reductions that result from a unit train tariff rate . This dichotomy in 
economic advantages creates a notable barrier to the acceptability of a subter-
minal project by individual firm s withi n New England. 
In contrast, the winter silo program offers great flexibility in developing 
a procurement and storage program . Movements of feed grain into the reserve 
storage facilities are not tied to la rge volume shipments. Moreover shipments 
o f one car or multi -car loads can be received and unloaded at the facility. Such 
fl exibility offers firms the freed om to enter the grain market to take advantage 
of time and location price variations. There is no requirement to contract with 
a central supplier who can guarantee large volumes for delivery. 
Providing reserve storage at central locations, however, st ill remains a 
capital intensive project. There exists a direct capital and operation cost to the 
region but, as noted, thi s can be minimized by localing storage at existing feed 
mixing plants . The acceptability of either alternative rests on the methods of 
financing and the development of support from federal and state agencies. 
Summary 
Storage facilities presently utilized by the formula feed mixing industry 
a re inadequate to house an emergency supply of ingredient materials. Evidence 
shows conclusively that an expanded storage capability is required in New 
England . Estimated additional storage requirements total 40, tOO tons: 15,200 
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tons in Maine, 8,200 tons in Vermont, 11,000 tons required for Massachusetts 
and New Hampshire combined, and 5,700 tons for Connecticut. 
The economic feasibility of establishing emergency storage was reviewed 
under two plans. One entailed the use of unit train grain subterminals as 
reserve storage centers. The alternative plan examined the feasibility of utiliz-
ing storage silos as district emergency storage sites. Capital requirement 
estimates were also made for storage located at existing plants. 
Under the plan to construct district silos to house emergency stocks, 
capital investment requirements range from 2.8 to 3.5 million dollars, at 1976 
prices. Expected annual costs to operate the elevators varied from a low of 
$533,000 to a high of $686,000. In tcrms of a premium cost to guarantee an 
emergency supply for the region, it represents a maximum cost of $0.35 per 
ton based on 1975 feedstuff consumption requirements. 
Reserve storage requirements, however, are significantly reduced under 
the plan to establish grain subterminal elevators to service grain shipments by 
unit train. The daily operation of these facilities insured the feed mixing in-
dustry a reserve of 23,600 tons in subterminal storage. Accordingly this reserve 
in conjunction with the existing storage capacity can service emergency feed re -
quirements in southern and central New England, and Maine. Additional 
capital investments, however, are required in Vermont. A 1.8 million dollar 
capital outlay is needed to construct a facility which can offer the local feed 
mixing industry a sufficient storage capability. Expenditures to support its 
operation result in an annual cost of approximately $121,000 at 1976 price 
levels. 
Implementation of a reserve storage program in concert with the grain 
subterminal system is a cost efficient system. The additional capital outlay re-
Quired in Vermont represents an annual cost to the region of approximately 
$0.07 per ton based on 1975 feedstuff consumption requirements. In com-
parison to the district silo plan a savings of $0.28 per ton is realized by the 
regIOn. 
The acceptability of the two plans is also contingent on organizational 
parameters. The subterminal project requires the centralization of grain pur-
chasing decisions. As a result the freedom of participating firms to make in-
dividual purchasing decisions in response to price variation is curtailed 
significantly. The centralization of activities is not as rigid under a reserve 
grain program. Individual firms still maintain autonomy in developing and 
carrying out purchasing decisions in the grain market place. 
Individual firms building emergency storage at existing locations seems 
to be the most desirable system. Both capital requirements and operating costs 
are minimized. It also retains the greatest amount of flexibility. Government 
participation would be required in order to assure access to supplies during 
emergencies by firms not building additional storage. The greatest disadvan-
tage is the lack of assurance that sufficient storage will be built to provide pro-
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OPERATING COSTS 
Distribution Costs Total 
Plant Costs Direct Delivery Shrinkage Operati ng Costs 





....................................................................... ·····dollars·············· .... · .... ···· ······ .... .... ·· ······ .... ..................... .. 
Augusta , 477,880 68 1,651 1.43 238,940 2.00 238,940 1,878,483 3.93 2,400,000 
Me. 
Fitchburg , 163.956 313,240 1.91 389,063 2.37 81,978 784,282 4.78 1.150,000 
Ma. 
Wil limanti c, 167,076 315,757 1.89 204,100 1.22 83,538 603,395 3.61 1, 150,000 
Ct. 
St. Albans. 95.004 245,110 2.58 183,350 1.93 47 .502 475.962 5.01 t ,800,000 
VI. 
New Eng land 903,916 1,555,758 1,72 1,734,406 1.92 45 1,958 3.742,122 4.1 4 6,500,000 
1 All A TC's are average tota l cost per ton. 
2 Shrinkage cos t is $.50 per ton. To obta in A TC add ATC pfant and ATC delivery cost p lus $.50 or divide annual to tal opera ting 
cost by tonnage. 
-(J) 
APPENDIX II 
Potential Savings Resulting From Proposed Conrail Aates, New England, 19771, 
Total Grain 
Subterminal Proposed Existing 
Operaling Unit Train Tariff Economic Total 
Dest ina tion Cost Rate Rate2 Savings Savings3 
·Per Ton- ·Per Ton- ·Per Ton- ·Per Ton - (OOO's) 
............ .... ........ ...... ....... ......................... Dollars .......................................... ............... .... . 
Augusta, 
Me. 3.93 12.70 2000 3.37 1.611 
W il l imant ic . 
CI. 3.6 1 11 .25 16.00 1.14 191 
Fitchburg. 
Ma 4.78 11 .25 16.45 .42 69 
51. Albans, 
VI. 5.01 11.05 15.30 - .76 -72 
10nly savings from Toledo, Ohio are ca lcula ted Since exis t ing rates from Ft. Wayne, Indiana and 
Decatur. Ill inoIs were not readily available. 
2Existing fare as of January 7, 1977. 
3TotaJ dollar savings based on 1975 corn shipments of 477,880 tons. 
